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FIRST DRAFT PICK OR BENCHED 
INDEFINITELY? THE FUTURE OF THE 






This paper argues that attempts to conceptualise professional sports 
leagues in the United States as “single entities” for antitrust purposes 
constitutes a fundamental misapplication of basic antitrust principles.  
Instead, professional sports leagues are more correctly treated as consortia 
of competitors, through which anticompetitive arrangements could well be 
reached.  The United States Supreme Court arguably reached this conclusion 
in American Needle,1 but its judgment left the future of the so-called 
“Single-Entity Doctrine” unsatisfactorily unclear.  Analysing American 
Needle in the context of modern antitrust, it is clear that like professional 
sports leagues in other jurisdictions, leagues in the United States are not 
“single entities,” but horizontal arrangements to which Rule of Reason 
analysis can and should be applied.  
The paper first briefly canvasses the history of the Single-Entity 
Doctrine in United States antitrust law through to the early 2000s, with 
particular focus on the development of the doctrine in relation to the 
professional sports industry.  It next discusses the Supreme Court’s decision 
in American Needle, arguably a turning point for the doctrine but a judgment 
that leaves some questions about the doctrine’s future unanswered.  It then 
attempts to reconcile the theory underlying the Single-Entity Doctrine (both 
before and after American Needle) with contemporary antitrust law, both in 
 
 Luke Archer holds an LL.M. from the University of Toronto and an LL.B. and a B.A. from Victoria 
University of Wellington, New Zealand.  He is an Enrolled Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of 
New Zealand and has worked in competition/antitrust law in New Zealand both in private practice and 
at the New Zealand Commerce Commission.  Archer would like to thank David Goldstein and Gordon 
Kirke for coordinating the Sports Law course at the University of Toronto during 2018; Lorna Brosnahan 
and Emily Archer for their support during the writing of this article; and the Editors of the Review for 
publishing an article written by a New Zealander living in Canada concerning American sports law. The 
opinions expressed in this article are Archer’s alone, as are any errors or omissions.  He now resides in 
Melbourne, Australia, and can be contacted at lmdarcher@gmail.com.  
1.  Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
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the United States and in other jurisdictions.  It then looks to the future, 
asking if (and if so, how) the Single-Entity Doctrine should survive, as well 
as how the courts might instead apply antitrust principles to sports leagues.  
It concludes that, although professional sports leagues do have special 
characteristics unlike many other markets, treating them as “single entities” 
is a misapplication of antitrust principles that effectively, and incorrectly, 
immunizes them from scrutiny under section one of the Sherman Act.  
Instead, leagues are complex yet traditional horizontal arrangements to 
which Rule of Reason analysis ought always to be applied.  
I. SETTING THE SCENE:  ANTITRUST AND THE SINGLE-ENTITY 
DOCTRINE 
The fundamental goal of antitrust law—regardless of whether one’s 
focus is on prices or output; or whether one sees antitrust through the 
Chicago, Harvard, or post-Chicago Schools—is to ensure the maintenance 
of competitive markets for the long-term benefits of consumers.2  Antitrust 
law regulates both unilateral and multilateral conduct, but antitrust statutes, 
beginning with the Sherman Act,3 recognise a clear difference between the 
unilateral exercise of market power by one single entity4 and the 
anticompetitive collaboration or collusion between two or more competitors 
in the same market.5  
Multilateral contracts, arrangements and understandings between 
competitors attract antitrust liability if they have either anticompetitive 
purpose or effect.  The most egregious forms of cartel conduct, including 
“naked” restraints such as price-fixing and bid-rigging, are generally 
prohibited per se;6 whereas other types of arrangements are subject to a more 
rigorous competition analysis.  In the United States, analysis of such 
 
2.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2, 31–33 
(2005); Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory:  A 
Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L. J. 25, 49 (1991); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 
(1979).  For a statutory restatement of this objective in one of the jurisdictions discussed below, see 
Commerce Act 1986, s 1A (N.Z.).  Note that antitrust law is commonly referred to as “competition law” 
outside of the United States.  Since this paper is primarily grounded in United States professional sports 
and United States law, it will generally use the term “antitrust.”  
3.  Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004). 
4.  This concept is sometimes referred to, particularly in American case law and literature (due to the 
wording of section 2 of the Sherman Act), as “monopolization.”  This paper will refer to the concept as 
“exercise of market power” in order to make it clear that it is not strictly necessary for an entity to be a 
“monopoly” in order for it to face antitrust scrutiny under these sections (for example, Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2 (1890); Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, ss 78–79 (Can.); Commerce Act 1986, s 36 
(N.Z.); Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s 46 (Austl.). 
5.  HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 140–49.  Note that antitrust laws also restrict anticompetitive 
conduct as between two entities in separate, but related, markets; but that such “vertical” multilateral 
restraints are outside of the scope of this paper. 
6.  See, for example, in the United States context, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 211 
(1898); in the Canadian context, Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, s 45 (Can.); and in the New 
Zealand context, Commerce Act 1986, s 30 (N.Z.). 
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arrangements is on a net basis under the “Rule of Reason,” a three-step test 
under which (in short): a plaintiff must prove a degree of market power such 
that competitive harm is possible; the burden shifts to the respondent to then 
establish the arrangement’s procompetitive goals (or effects) outweighing 
any anticompetitive effects; and finally the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff, who must show that the agreement is overly restrictive, i.e. that the 
procompetitive benefits could be obtained through less restrictive means.7  
Under other countries’ antitrust laws, for instance those of Canada,8 
Australia,9 and New Zealand,10 the analysis is generally similar, but 
undertaken through the framework of an arrangement between competitors 
needing to have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of “substantially 
lessening competition in a market” to attract liability. 
On the other hand, one cannot anti-competitively collude or conspire 
with oneself: multiple actors within the same legal entity, for example 
attorneys within the same law firm or salespeople on the same car-yard, can 
“collude with impunity.”11  Instead, an entity acting alone can only be liable 
if it has engaged in the unilateral exercise of a substantial degree of market 
power (or, actual or threatened “monopolization”) to actually harm 
competitive rivals or potential entrants through mechanisms that also harm 
consumers and the competitive process, a much higher standard than for 
multilateral conduct.12   
The distinction between unilateral and multilateral conduct is therefore 
significant: regardless of jurisdiction, unilateral conduct claims are much 
more rare, being harder for a plaintiff to prove and “comparatively easy to 
defend.”13  Accordingly, whether the conduct of entities under antitrust 
scrutiny is viewed as multi-firm, multilateral conduct or single-firm 
 
7.  The classic statement of the Rule of Reason is in the United States Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Bd. of Trade Chi. v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); and a recent restatement can be found in Leegin 
Creative Leather Prod. Inc. v PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).  See generally Gabriel Feldman, The 
Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the 
Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject a Flawed Defense, 4 WIS. L. REV. 835, 840–44 (2009); Stephen 
F. Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine of Antitrust as Applied to Sports Leagues, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 225, 227–28 (Michael A. McCann ed., 2017), 
dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190465957.013.11.  
8.  Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, s 90.1 (Can.). 
9.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s 45 (Austl.). 
10.  Commerce Act 1986, s 27 (N.Z.). 
11.  J. Matthew Schmitten, Antitrust’s Single-Entity Doctrine:  A Formalistic Approach for a 
Formalistic Rule, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 93, 98–105 (2012).  See also Alan Devlin & Michael 
Jacobs, Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 543, 547–52 
(2011); OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION AND SPORTS 29–30 
(2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-sports-2010.pdf. 
12.  Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890); Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, ss 78–79 (Can.); 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s 46 (Austl.); Commerce Act 1986, s 36 (N.Z.).  See also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 150–55; Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra note 7, at 226. 
13.  Nathaniel Grow, Note, There’s No “I” in “League”: Professional Sports Leagues and the Single 
Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183, 185 (2006).  See also Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra 
note 7, at 226–27. 
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unilateral conduct makes a considerable difference to those firms’ potential 
liability.14  Being able to characterise joint-firm conduct as the unilateral 
actions of a “single entity” rather than as multilateral agreements between 
competitors effectively allows those firms to escape antitrust scrutiny, and 
therefore liability, for what may well be anticompetitive (but not 
monopolistic) actions. 
Given the above, subjecting the actions of a joint venture operation 
between two or more competitors to antitrust scrutiny raises issues.  Are 
such operations better characterised as one single firm, only subject to 
scrutiny under the stricter unilateral conduct standard; or are they instead by 
their very nature a multilateral arrangement subject to the per se rules and/or 
the Rule of Reason?  To be sure, some joint venture-type arrangements 
create massive efficiencies such that entire markets would not exist without 
them,15 for instance the joint venture at the heart of the Broadcast Music Inc. 
case that concerned the modern recorded-music copyright licensing 
system.16  On the other hand, the threat is that much like any other (non-
structural) anticompetitive arrangement, a joint venture between 
competitors will facilitate inefficient behaviour, and result in higher prices 
and lower output than would have been the case had those entities continued 
to act, and compete, independently. 
Moreover, the unique structure of the professional sports industry raises 
more conceptual concerns about the application of antitrust rules to teams 
and leagues.  Sport by its very nature is a competitive exercise, and unlike 
most industries, simply to exist, the business of professional sport requires 
a degree of cooperation among entities that may otherwise be competitors.17 
Indeed, the very formation of a league involves the coming together of, and 
contracting between, independently organised teams to agree on (at the very 
least) the rules of the game.18  Robert Bork referred to professional sports as 
one of the rare commercial activities that “can only be carried out jointly,”19 
and various United States courts have affirmed the “special characteristics” 
 
14.  Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 11, at 544. 
15.  Sherman J. Clark, Why Sports Law? 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 151, 157 (2017); Devlin & 
Jacobs, supra note 11, at 547–49. 
16.  See generally Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).  See also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 29; Jacobs, supra note 2, at 50–51. 
17.  See generally Oliver Budzinski & Stefan Szymanski, Are Restrictions of Competition by Sports 
Associations Horizontal or Vertical in Nature?, ILMENAU ECON. DISCUSSION PAPERS , 9 (2014); Clark, 
supra note 15, at 153; HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 29–30. 
18.  James L. Brock, Jr., Comment, A Substantive Test for Sherman Act Plurality: Applications for 
Professional Sports Leagues, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1009–15 (1985); Budzinski & Symanski, supra 
note 17, at 409–10; OECD, supra note 11, at 15–17; Warren Pengilley, Restraint of Trade and Antitrust: 
A Pigskin Review Post Super League, 6 CANTERBURY L. REV. 610, 628–29 (1997). 
19.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 278 (1978). 
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of professional sports distinguishing sports from other markets.20 The 
valuable product—the sport itself—could not exist without some degree of 
collaboration, agreement and joint action between teams; and in turn the 
teams would have little independent purpose without the existence of the 
league.21  Conversely, though, teams are independent economic entities that 
compete with each other for viewership, ticket sales, and athletes (that is, 
labour), amongst other things.22  Accordingly, professional sports teams 
may well, through the artifice of a league, jointly adopt anticompetitive rules 
that reduce output and quality, and increase price, exploiting consumers.23 
The question, then, is how to treat a professional sports league and its 
constituent teams for antitrust purposes. Although comprised of individual 
teams, is a league one single entity acting collectively; or instead, is a league 
merely a set of agreements between the individual teams, all of whom are 
entities in competition with each other?  In the United States (where the vast 
majority of antitrust assessment of professional sports has occurred), if it is 
the latter, then a league’s actions—and the actions of its constituent teams—
are able to be assessed as horizontal multilateral actions subject to per se 
liability and the Rule of Reason; whereas if it is the former, the league can 
only be subjected to antitrust scrutiny for actual or attempted 
monopolization.  One can clearly see, then, why professional sports leagues 
might want to fashion a rule—a doctrine—that for antitrust purposes, their 
actions are always those of a “single entity.” 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE SINGLE-ENTITY DOCTRINE 
Although this paper examines the Single-Entity Doctrine as applicable 
to professional sports leagues, the doctrine is not confined to the sports 
context.  Instead, it is an application of general antitrust principles to 
situations in which entities linked in some fashion—for instance, joint 
venture partners; or, indeed, entities in joint ownership and membership of 
a professional organisation—act in a collaborative fashion.  Tracing the 
history of the doctrine, it is apparent that once antitrust began looking at the 
substance rather than the form of  joint venture operations—after 
Copperweld24—the doctrine became applicable to professional sports 
 
20.  Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also Am. 
Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football 
League, 670 F.2d. 1249, 1251 (2nd Cir. 1982); Nat’l Coll. Athletic Assoc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
21.  Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 11, at 544; Feldman, supra note 7, at 844–46; Gary R. Roberts, 
Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on 
Intraleague Rivalry, 32 U. CAL. L.A. L. REV. 219, 226–29 (1984). 
22.  Brock, supra note 18, at 1009–15; Leah Farzin, On the Antitrust Exemption for Professional 
Sports in the United States and Europe, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L. J. 75, 77–78 (2015). 
23.  Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra note 7, at 225. 
24.  Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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leagues and was engaged by those leagues in an attempt to immunise their 
decisions from antitrust scrutiny. 
The doctrine as applied to professional sports in the United States stems 
from the Supreme Court’s creation and subsequent severe limiting of a 
general exemption from the antitrust laws for professional sports leagues.  
In the early days of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“interstate commerce” in that Act was sufficiently narrow such that in 1922, 
the Court did not consider the (national) operation of professional baseball 
to fall within the scope of the Act.25  However, despite efforts on the parts 
of both the National Football League26 and inter-state boxing promoters,27 
the Court later refused to apply the same logic to other professional sports.  
Accordingly, Major League Baseball’s common-law exemption from the 
antitrust laws, although still in existence,28 is somewhat of an aberration.29  
Unable to secure a common-law exemption, and unsuccessful in persuading 
Congress to enact a statutory blanket exemption to all professional sports in 
the 1950s and 60s,30 professional sports leagues looked to fashion such an 
exemption through the operation of the antitrust laws themselves – in 
particular, through the “single-entity” treatment of joint venture-type 
operations. 
Until the 1980s, in assessing the antitrust liability of joint venture-type 
arrangements, United States courts tended to look solely at the form of the 
relevant entity rather than the substance of the entity, its actions, and the 
relevant market(s).31  For instance, the Supreme Court held in Yellow Cab,32 
Kiefer-Stewart,33 and Perma Life34 that separately-incorporated yet jointly-
controlled businesses, including wholly-owned subsidiaries, were separate 
entities able to collude with one another despite their common control.  In 
the joint venture context, a key example is the United States Supreme 
 
25.  Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 
(1922).  
26.  Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); see also Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 
593 F.2d. 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
27.  U.S. v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). 
28.  Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282–83 
(1972). 
29.  Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. Also, see discussion in Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports:  Must 
Competition on the Field Displace Competition in the Market?, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263, 264–67 (1993); 
Farzin, supra note 22, at 80, 85–88; and Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra note 7, at 225–26, 228–
29. 
30.  Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra note 7, at 229. 
31.  See generally discussion in Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity 
Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L. J. 449, 456–57 (2011); and Schmitten, 
supra note 11, at 104–13.  
32.  See U.S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). 
33.  Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 213–14 (1951). 
34.  Perma Life Mufflers v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141–42 (1968). 
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Court’s 1967 judgment in United States v Sealy,35 in which it poured cold 
water on a “single entity” claim by a joint venture engaging in market 
allocation in contravention of section one of the Sherman Act.  Sealy, a 
mattress and bedding manufacturer, was owned collectively by its 
downstream licensees, mattress retailers in competition with one another.  
The majority refuted Sealy’s claim that it and its licensees were one single 
entity unable to collude with itself, noting that “Sealy was a joint venture of, 
by, and for its stockholder-licensees [in competition with one another] . . . 
we are moved by the identity of the persons who act, rather than the label of 
their hats.”36  
On the other hand, there were indications even at this early stage that 
the form of the relevant entity may not be the sole consideration. In the 
sports context, in 1974, the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California held that the National Hockey League and the San 
Francisco Seals, a member team of the NHL, were “acting together as one 
single business enterprise, competing against other similarly organized 
professional [hockey] leagues.”37  That is, that the NHL and its member 
teams were effectively one single entity, unable to collude with itself.  In so 
holding, the Court noted that teams within leagues (and the league as an 
entity) may “compete” with each other in the sporting sense, but they could 
not be construed to be competitors in the economic sense.38  The Court 
distinguished the NHL from the co-operative association of supermarkets in 
Topco that had recently been found to violate section one of the Sherman 
Act due to the professional sports context,39 putting particular weight on the 
fact that although the supermarkets could exist independently of the 
association, the existence of the NHL “makes possible a segment of 
commercial activity which could hardly exist without it.”40  The San 
Francisco Seals case is somewhat of an anomaly in an era where courts 
appeared concerned more with an entity’s form than its substance. 
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals came to effectively the 
opposite conclusion in 1982, in North American Soccer League v. NFL.41  
In that case, the NFL attempted to restrain its member teams from investing 
in the nascent North American Soccer League (“NASL”), which brought 
suit against the NFL under section one of the Sherman Act.  The Court, in 
that case, emphasised that although the NFL was a joint venture and its 
member teams had a broader joint interest in the success of professional 
football as a whole, and indeed jointly produced the product of professional 
 
35.  See U.S. v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
36.  Id. at 353–54.  
37.  S.F. Seals, Ltd. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 379 F.Supp 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
38.  Id. at 969–70. 
39.  U.S. v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
40.  S.F. Seals, Ltd., 379 F.Supp. at 970. 
41.  N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d. 1249 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
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football, its member teams were also individually-owned legal entities with 
distinct economic interests independent from those of the league as an 
organisation.42  The Court noted that the restraint was not simply to protect 
the NFL from competition from the NASL, but also allowed its individual 
teams to be insulated from competition from NASL teams in their 
localities.43  The Court refused to allow the NFL and its teams to escape 
antitrust liability on the basis that they were one “single entity,” instead 
subjecting the restraint to Rule of Reason analysis.44  The Ninth Circuit 
subsequently came to a similar conclusion in the Oakland Raiders case in 
early 1984.45 
By the early 1980s, general antitrust literature had grown sceptical of 
the formalistic (rather than substantive) assessment of what was at that point 
referred to as the “intraenterprise conspiracy” doctrine.46  In mid-1984, the 
Supreme Court followed suit in Copperweld, a case concerning alleged 
collusion between a steel tubing company and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary.47  The majority of the Court stated that parents and subsidiaries, 
“not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of 
a single driver,” share a “unity of purpose or common design.”48  Such 
situations did not concern separate economic actors pursuing separate and 
divergent economic incentives.49  Accordingly, provided there were such 
unified interests in their objectives, coordinated behaviour between parent 
and subsidiary entities could be treated as the actions of one single entity, 
outside of the scope of section one of the Sherman Act.   
In line with the discussion in the previous section of this paper, after 
Copperweld, it was clear that “single entities” such as the commonly-owned 
tubing companies in that case could not engage in concerted conduct within 
the purview of section one of the Sherman Act.  However, over the ensuing 
years, various joint venture-type arrangements were also able to utilize the 
“unity of purpose” theory in order to immunize what would have otherwise 
been clearly collusive activity from section one liability (notwithstanding 
the fact that the court in Copperweld did not clearly state that non jointly-
owned entities could so avail themselves of the Copperweld test).50 Two 
examples include, franchisor/franchisee relationships (perhaps suggesting 
that Sealy would have been decided differently after Copperweld) and 
 
42.  Id. at 1250-52.  
43.  Id. at 1257. 
44.  Id. at 1257-58. 
45.  L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d. 1381, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984). 
46.  That is, concerning joint ventures generally, not just in the sports context.  See discussion in 
Schmitten, supra note 11, at 109, citing in particular Phillip Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in 
Decline, 97 HARV. L. REV. 451 (1983).  See also Grow, American Needle, supra note 31, at 457. 
47.  See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 755-57 (1984). 
48.  Id. at 771-72. 
49.  Id. at 769, 775.  See also Brock, supra note 18, at 1002-04. 
50.  Brock, supra note 18, at 1004–05; Grow, American Needle, supra note 31, at 459. 
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agreements between trade associations and their members.51  In the same 
vein, professional sports leagues seized the occasion to build on the 
conclusion in Copperweld, reject the contrary reasoning in North American 
Soccer League and Oakland Raiders, and create the exemption from the 
antitrust laws that they had been seeking since at least the 1950s.52  
In 1996, the NBA was effectively successful in creating such an 
exemption through the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Chicago Professional Sports v NBA (“Bulls II”).53  In that case, Judge 
Easterbrook wrote that, despite previous confusion on this point,54 under the 
Copperweld doctrine, professional sports leagues were clearly able to be 
treated as single entities and thus immune from antitrust suit under section 
one of the Sherman Act.  He noted that although the NBA’s member teams 
were individually owned, this did not imply that they were economic 
competitors “any more than separate ownership of hamburger joints [as 
franchises] . . . implies that McDonald’s is a cartel.”55  Although there may 
have been “conflicts” between member teams, these were analogous to 
conflicts between different units of large firms “such as General Motors or 
IBM,” rather than those between economic competitors.56  Judge 
Easterbrook stated that Copperweld had not in fact held that there needed to 
be “complete unity of interest” between the parties in order for them to be 
treated as a single entity; only that in Copperweld the parent-subsidiary 
relationship of the “single entity” in that case had resulted in such a 
complete unity.57  Although he left open the possibility of member teams 
being economic competitors in the labour services market for players,58 
under Judge Easterbrook’s analysis, sports leagues ought to be treated as 
single entities producing one single product—the sport—with cooperation 
between member teams being essential to the creation of that product.59  
Accordingly, by the late 1990s, United States antitrust jurisprudence 
had developed to the point where it was accepted that, as discussed above, 
professional sports leagues could well be treated as “single entities” that 
 
51.  Schmitten, supra note 11, at 113 (citing, respectively, Williams v Nevada, 999 F.2d. 445 (9th 
Cir. 1993) and Levi Case Co. v ATS Prods. Inc., 788 F.Supp. 428 (N.D. Cal. 1992)).  See also Grow, 
American Needle, supra note 31, at 459–64. 
52.  Donald G. Kempf Jr., Misapplication of Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 
DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 628–31 (1983).  
53.  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d. 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1996). 
54.  See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d. 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992). 
55.  Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship, 95 F.3d. at 598.  
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. at 600. 
59.  Id. at 598-99. 
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could not conspire or collude with each other, and could accordingly be 
exempt from the operation of section one of the Sherman Act. 60 
III. AMERICAN NEEDLE: MUCH-NEEDED CLARITY? 
Despite the above, the question of whether professional sports leagues 
were “single entities” for antitrust purposes was not entirely settled through 
the late 1990s and early 2000s,61 until it was directly considered by the 
United States Supreme Court in American Needle v NFL.62  
American Needle concerned a challenge to the NFL’s granting of an 
exclusive intellectual property license for the manufacture and sale of NFL-
branded apparel.  In 1963, the NFL and its member teams had formed a 
separate legal entity, National Football League Properties (“NFLP”), to 
hold, develop, license, and market all teams’ intellectual property, revenues 
from which were shared amongst the teams.63  In 2000, the teams for the 
first time voted to grant an exclusive license over all teams’ intellectual 
property in a specific area, granting Reebok an exclusive license to 
manufacture headwear featuring all thirty-two teams’ trademarks.  
American Needle, which had previously shared a nonexclusive license to 
the relevant intellectual property, filed suit under sections one and two of 
the Sherman Act.  The NFL argued, citing Bulls II, that it ought to be treated 
as a “single entity” for section one purposes: the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois agreed, noting that the teams had “so integrated 
their operations that they should be deemed a single entity rather than joint 
ventures cooperating for a common purpose.”64 The Seventh Circuit Courts 
of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was irrelevant whether the teams could 
have competed with one another to licence their IP, and in line with the 
reasoning in Bulls II, it would be “silly” to consider the teams a single entity 
only if they had completely unified interests (to use the Copperweld 
language).65  American Needle appealed, with the NFL supporting its 
petition for certiorari in an attempt to have the Supreme Court finally 
declare the Single-Entity Doctrine applicable to sports leagues to immunize 
its actions from section one scrutiny.66 
 
60.  Notwithstanding the potential exception to this perceived immunity from the ambit of section 
one of the Sherman Act in the labor market for player services, mentioned above: Id. at 600.  See also 
Kempf, supra note 52, at 628. For the primary point, see Grow, There’s No I in League, supra note 13, 
at 186-88. 
61.  Feldman, supra note 7, at 837; Grow, There’s No I in League, supra note 13, at 187. 
62.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 187 (2010).  
63.  Id. at 187-88. 
64.  Am. Needle Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F.Supp.2d. 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
65.  Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d. 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008). 
66.  Roger D. Blair & Wenche Wang, Will American Needle Burst the NFL’s Balloon?, 38 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 664, 666 (2017). 
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The Supreme Court sharply, and unanimously, disagreed with the lower 
courts, holding that that in the context of selling rights to manufacture 
apparel, the NFL was not one single entity, but instead a combination of 
competitors.67  The Court canvassed the history of the Single-
Entity/intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, synthesising its previous 
decisions, including Copperweld, to state that what is most important in 
determining whether a joint venture is a single entity is a “functional 
consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct actually operate.”68  The Court rejected a formalistic approach: if 
the creation of a joint venture in fact “deprives the marketplace of 
independent centers of decisionmaking,” the decisions of the venture ought 
to be scrutinised, as cartelists should not be able to “evade” antitrust laws 
simply by forming a joint venture to put their anticompetitive agreement 
into practice.69 
Previous cases, particularly Bulls II, had attempted to analogise sports 
leagues to large organisations such as GM and IBM, businesses within 
which different branches may nominally compete but could not collude.  
The Supreme Court rejected that analogy; unlike other organisations 
operating as a combination of smaller entities, the NFL does not have one 
single CEO or Board of Directors making all decisions, with concomitant 
economic incentives and fiduciary duties to the broader company.70  Instead, 
teams within the NFL are independent, profit-maximising “separate 
economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,” and those economic 
interests are not necessarily always aligned.71 
Moreover, in the context of the creation and marketing of intellectual 
property, teams clearly did actually compete with each other: “[t]o a firm 
making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing 
suppliers of valuable trademarks.”72  Despite ostensibly operating through 
the joint venture company, when making decisions concerning intellectual 
property licensing, each team was in fact making decisions “reflect[ing] not 
only an interest in NFLP’s profits but also an interest in the team’s 
individual profits.”73 
The Supreme Court was unmoved by the NFL’s submissions regarding 
the sporting context of the joint marketing arrangements.  For instance, the 
NFL submitted that “without [the teams’] cooperation, there would be no 
football”; but the Court responded that “a nut and bolt can only operate 
together, but an agreement between nut and bolt manufacturers is still 
 
67.  Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 202–03. 
68.  Id. at 191. 
69.  Id. at 197–99 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)). 
70.  Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra note 7, at 231. 
71.  Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 197-98 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769). 
72.  Id. at 197. 
73.  Id. at 201. 
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subject to §1 analysis.”74 Similarly, even though the joint marketing 
arrangements dated back to 1963 and were in the teams’ collective economic 
interests, cartel behaviour is generally in the cartelists’ economic interests 
at the expense of those who are not parties, and that the longstanding nature 
of a anticompetitive arrangement does not immunise it from scrutiny.75 
 The Court did not conclude that leagues could never be considered to 
be single entities, however, noting that the “special characteristics” of the 
sports industry may, at times, allow for cooperation between teams and 
some degree of collective decision-making.76  In this case, however, the 
separate entity the teams had used, NFLP, was an “instrumentality of the 
teams,” much like the joint venture between the mattress manufacturers had 
been in Sealy over 40 years prior.77  Accordingly, the relevant intellectual 
property licensing arrangement was subject to Rule of Reason scrutiny 
under the Sherman Act. 
IV. AMERICAN NEEDLE, THE SINGLE-ENTITY DOCTRINE, AND MODERN 
SPORTS ANTITRUST 
The text of Supreme Court’s judgment in American Needle is clear: 
sports leagues are not to be treated as single entities—that is, when the 
constituent teams are making purely commercial licensing decisions 
operating through a separate, jointly-controlled corporation.  Despite the 
narrow question of law put to it in American Needle,78 the Supreme Court 
was remarkably vague about when, outside of the specific fact scenario in 
that case, leagues may in fact still be able to be treated as single entities for 
section one purposes.   This section situates the Single-Entity Doctrine in 
the context of antitrust law as of 2018.  First, it analyses the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in American Needle, attempting to clarify what the Court actually 
concluded about the doctrine.  It then briefly canvasses relevant law in some 
other jurisdictions for further perspective on the Supreme Court’s reasoning, 
laying the framework for the final section discussing the future of the 
doctrine. 
A. Unpacking American Needle 
The issue before the Supreme Court in American Needle was, by its own 
words, narrow: whether the licencing activity “must be viewed as that of a 
single enterprise for [the] purposes of §1.”79  It is remarkable that in 
 
74.  Id. at 198-99. 
75.  Id. at 198-99, 201.  
76.  Id. at 202, 204. In particular, see citation to Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
77.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 201 (2010). 
78.  Id. at 189. 
79.  Id. 
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answering that fact-specific question, the Supreme Court did not at the same 
time construct a legal test for when sports leagues will be treated as a single 
entity.  In this respect, Nathaniel Grow has described the Court’s decision 
as “unnecessarily and justifiably vague.”80  The discussion below of two key 
problems with the Court’s judgment indicates that American Needle did not, 
in fact, provide the clarity that the Single-Entity doctrine needs moving 
forwards.   
One issue with the Supreme Court’s judgment is that it did not clearly 
discuss, or distinguish, Dagher, a 2006 case in which it suggested that the 
“core activity” of a joint-venture ought to be treated as single-entity conduct. 
Accordingly, such conduct was effectively immune from section one 
analysis.81  In the case of some joint-ventures—Manufacturers A and B 
joining to develop new Product C—the “core activity” of a joint venture 
may well be clear, and surely decisions regarding the pricing of Product C 
ought to be treated as those of a single entity. On the other hand, operating 
in the modern world, the A/B joint venture is also likely to need to licence, 
or at least deal with, intellectual property regarding Product C (whatever 
that product may be).  Following that logic, it is at least arguable that the 
“core activity” of a sports league might encompass the licencing of 
intellectual property—but the Supreme Court ruled in American Needle that 
this was not the case.  Determining the bounds of a “core activity” is 
consequently a difficult question for a court,82 not at all assisted by the 
Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the sports context in American Needle. 
Another issue with the Supreme Court’s judgment in American Needle 
is that although it implores courts to look beyond the form of a joint-venture-
type operation and towards its substance,83 it provides no framework for 
such analysis.  It is clear that competitors cannot simply incorporate a 
jointly-owned entity to escape scrutiny, but what level of integration short 
of merger could lead to a “single entity”? In the sports context, Devlin and 
Jacobs have suggested that the Court’s focus on the “economic substance” 
of the situation could lead to perverse results based on status quo market 
conditions rather than the efficiency of the actual venture’s operations.84  For 
instance, they consider that the Court would likely view many of the actions 
of a sports league that had historically been tightly centrally controlled as 
those of a “single entity”; but would treat the same actions by a league with 
decentralised power and ownership differently—due to a quirk of history 
(that then created the dynamics of the ‘market’) rather than actual 
 
80.  Grow, American Needle, supra note 31, at 486. 
81.  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2006); see also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 11, at 554–
56; Grow, American Needle, supra note 31, at 468-70, 480-83, 486. 
82.  Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 11, at 547, 564. 
83.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010). 
84.  Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 11, at 557-62. 
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efficiency.85  In the latter example, would the re-centralisation of power at a 
later date then change the Court’s analysis of its actions from concerted to 
unilateral?  It is entirely unclear. 
B. Squaring the Single-Entity Doctrine with International Antitrust 
The Supreme Court’s lack of clarity in American Needle is even more 
striking considering that international jurisdictions have considered similar 
issues and come to more precise conclusions.  For instance, Antipodean 
cases involving another sports discipline with an oval-shaped ball—rugby—
demonstrate a clearer method of analysing a sports league: as a consortium 
of competitors, to the actions of which Rule of Reason-type analysis can 
easily and should be applied.  Similarly, recent European Union antitrust 
law demonstrates a move towards assessing sports leagues’ conduct under a 
Rule of Reason-type approach despite the vastly different, vertical structure 
of European sports leagues. 
1. New Zealand  
Despite its status as a sports-mad country, there is a death of sports-
related competition law jurisprudence in New Zealand.86  The key cases 
involve a succession of applications by the New Zealand Rugby Union 
(“NZRU”) to the New Zealand Commerce Commission (“Commission”) for 
authorisations of certain restrictive trade practices common to sports 
worldwide, including a salary cap and player transfer regulations.87  The 
restrictions that were the subject of the authorisations do not strictly touch 
on matters central to the Single-Entity Doctrine,88 however they broadly 
illustrate the Commission’s approach to sporting matters. 
 
85. Id. 
86.  See Andrew F. Simpson, Promoting ‘Match Quality’ in New Zealand Rugby:  Authorisation of 
Salary Caps and Player Transfer Restrictions under the Commerce Act 1986 (NZ), 7 AUSTL. & N.Z. 
SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (2012). 
87.  Under the Commerce Act 1986, the Commission can (on application from the relevant parties) 
authorise practices that would otherwise breach ss 27 or 30 of that Act.  In granting an authorisation, the 
Commission first establishes whether the relevant arrangement in fact has the purpose, effect or likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition in a market; and if so, whether there is sufficient net public 
benefit (including a broader range of considerations than in the strict competition analysis) to grant the 
authorisation. Commerce Act 1986, s 58-65D (N.Z.).  The relevant authorisation determinations are: 
New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1996] NZCC 281;  New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. 
[2006] NZCC 580; Amendment of an Authorisation Granted to the New Zealand Rugby Union in 
Decision 580 [2007] NZCC 601; and Revocation of an Authorisation Granted to the New Zealand Rugby 
Union Incorporated in Decision 580 [2011] NZCC 721.  For further detail relating to authorisations, see 
Simpson, supra note 86, at 7-9. 
88.  Simpson, supra note 86, at 3-4.  
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The NZRU89 is an incorporated society that governs the game of rugby 
throughout New Zealand,90 similar to United States sports leagues such as 
the NFL and NHL.91  Its Board of Directors is elected by delegates from the 
provincial rugby unions.  However, although the provincial unions that 
compete in local competitions, particularly the Air New Zealand Cup, are 
individually-owned incorporated societies with individual contracts with 
their players; all professional New Zealand players—in the All Blacks and 
in the Super Rugby transnational league—are employees of the NZRU 
directly.92  Accordingly, the authorisations only concerned matters relating 
to the provincial game, in particular the imposition of a salary cap and the 
setting of transfer regulations.   
In the 1996 Authorisation, the Commission clearly described the 
relevant arrangements as between the provincial unions and the NZRU as a 
separate entity; and as occurring within a market for the buying and selling 
of player services, and more importantly, the rights to those services.  In 
relation to these service markets, the Commission was also clear that the 
provincial unions compete with each other in the relevant market, a point 
which was upheld explicitly on appeal.93  The Commission affirmed the 
above in the 2006 Authorisation, although demurred on the point of whether 
there was a separate market between unions for the rights to player 
services.94  Regardless, in both decisions, the Commission came to the 
conclusion that the arrangements between the provincial unions—
independent entities notwithstanding their joint control of the NZRU—were 
likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in the relevant 
markets, both on their face as well as by virtue of limiting teams’ abilities 
to freely determine the process by which they set prices (i.e., a per se price-
fixing violation of the Commerce Act).95   
Notably, nowhere in the four authorisation determinations or the High 
Court’s upholding of the 1996 Authorisation on appeal is there any 
 
89.  Previously the New Zealand Rugby Football Union. 
90.  Technically “rugby union,” distinguishing the game from another discipline, “rugby league,” 
discussed below in relation to Australia. 
91.  The following is drawn from New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1996] NZCC 281, supra 
note 87, at paras 5-12 and New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [2006] NZCC 580, supra note 87, at 
paras 42-58.  
92.  See generally New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1996] NZCC 281, supra note 87, at 
paras 5-12; Rugby Union Players’ Ass’n Inc v. Commerce Comm’n (No 2) [1997] 3 NZLR 301 at 303-
304 (NZHC).  Note that one reason for this arrangement is that contracts of service—employment 
contracts—are excluded from New Zealand competition law:  Commerce Act 1986, s 44 (N.Z.).  On the 
other hand, contracts for service, i.e. independent contracting arrangements, are not so excluded from 
the Act. 
93.  New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [1996] NZCC 281, supra note 87, at paras 64-78, 151-
54, 240; Rugby Union Players’ Ass’n Inc, 3 NZLR at 305. 
94.  New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc. [2006] NZCC 580, supra note 87, at para 407-10; 
Simpson, supra note 86, at 13. 
95.  Grégory Basnier, Sports and Competition Law:  The Case of the Salary Cap in New Zealand 
Rugby Union, 14 INT. SPORTS L.J. 155, 158–59 (2014); Simpson, supra note 86, at 18. 
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suggestion that the NZRU and its constituent unions were a ‘single entity’ 
for competition law purposes.  This is the case even though the authorisation 
determinations also briefly address the broader national (consumer) market 
for sports entertainment.96  Further, the determinations—as required by the 
‘net benefits’ framework for authorisations—do in fact engage in detailed 
economic analysis of the likely effects of the relevant arrangements.97  The 
economic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice to say that 
despite the nebulous nature of some of the benefits claimed, the Commission 
was able to quantify the actual likely benefits and detriments of the 
arrangements in dollar terms, undertaking a far more rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis on the point than United States courts do in applying the Rule of 
Reason.  Hesitations, then, in applying traditional Rule of Reason analysis 
to sporting matters could well look to the Commission’s rugby authorisation 
decisions for guidance. 
2. Australia 
Two Australian cases regarding rugby league provide a clearer picture 
as to how competition law in the South Pacific sees sports leagues.  The 
first, News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd. [No 2] 
(“Superleague”)98 concerned News Limited’s attempt to set up a rival rugby 
league competition to the Australian Rugby League (“ARL”) and its 
attraction of clubs to its league in breach of those clubs’ “Loyalty 
Agreements” with the ARL.  The second, News Ltd v South Sydney Rugby 
Football Club Ltd. (“South Sydney”)99 concerned the later merger between 
the Superleague and the ARL forming the current National Rugby League, 
in relation to which South Sydney was the only pre-existing team from either 
league not admitted into the merged NRL.100 
Pengilley wrote that, “If ever there was doubt that professional sporting 
clubs were in trade and commerce or were competitive with each other, this 
doubt has been removed by the Full Federal Court decision in 
Superleague.”101  The ARL was, like American sports leagues, a body 
established by its constituent clubs for the purpose of running the 
professional game of rugby league in Australia, with similar profit-sharing 
 
96.  Simpson, supra note 86, at 12. 
97.  Id. at 20–31. See also Pengilley, supra note 18, at 651–53. 
98.  (1996) 64 FCR 410.   
99.  (2003) 215 CLR 563 (Austl.). 
100.  Note that both Superleague and South Sydney concerned the entering into of “exclusionary 
provisions,” a separate offence under what was then the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Austl.), now the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Austl.).  For the purposes of this discussion, the framework of that 
offence is roughly analogous to the general offence of entering into an arrangement that substantially 
lessens competition in a market. 
101.  Pengilley, supra note 18, at 661.   
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provisions and league rules as leagues like the NFL and NHL.102  In 
Superleague, the Court forcefully confirmed that sports leagues such as the 
ARL are purely commercial enterprises, and that in the context of 
professional sports, commercial matters involving competition between 
teams and leagues are not merely incidental to the creation of the product of 
sport.103   
In Superleague, the Full Federal Court squarely addressed matters at the 
core of the Single-Entity Doctrine.  As in American Needle, the Court looked 
not to the formal structure of the league, but to the content of the obligations 
the parties owed each other.104  The Court found that the league and its 
constituent clubs had divergent and independent commercial interests, and 
in turn, their relationships were at heart commercial.105  The Court found 
that there was competition between teams on commercial matters (“for 
spectators, sponsors, and television viewers”)106 as well as for players, but 
also that competition existed in a market between teams and the league 
itself, as clearly evidenced by the strict “Loyalty Agreements” between the 
teams and the ARL, which were clearly intended to restrict the supply of 
clubs and players to the nascent Superleague.107  
The High Court of Australia’s majority decision in South Sydney is less 
clearly directed towards the Single-Entity Doctrine, focusing more on the 
nature of “exclusionary provisions” under the Australian competition 
legislation.108  However, Ross recently commented that the case raises the 
conceptual point that, not only is there a field of competition as between 
teams (and potential/entrant teams) within a league for “team services,” but 
also there is also a broader field of competition as between leagues for 
“competition organizing services.”109 
The net effect of Superleague and, to a lesser extent, South Sydney, is 
that Australian antitrust law came to the same conclusion as American 
Needle, but sixteen years earlier and in a much clearer fashion.  Unlike the 
United States Supreme Court, the Australian courts appear to have had no 
conceptual difficulty in applying antitrust principles to sports leagues. 
 
 
102.  Damien Hazard, Note, The Trade Practices Act, Equity and Professional Sport: News Limited 
and Ors v Australian Rugby Football League Limited and Ors, 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1997). 
103.  Pengilley, supra note 18, at 614-16, 628-31. 
104.  News Ltd. v. S. Sydney Dis.t Rugby Football Club Ltd., (2003) 215 CLR 563, 538-39 (Austl.). 
105.  Hazard, supra note 102, at 98–101; News Ltd., 215 CLR at 539-51. 
106.  News Ltd,, 215 CLR at 565.  
107.  Hazard, supra note 102, at 99, 102–05; News Ltd., 215 CLR at 567-80. 
108.  See generally Chris Davies, Case Note: News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League 
Football Club Limited:  The High Court Decision, 10 JAMES COOK U.L. REV. 116 (2003). 
109.  S. F. Ross, Litigation as a Strategy to Overcome Monopolistic Inefficiency in Sports, 38 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 644, 652 (2017). 
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3. Europe 
A full discussion of sports antitrust across Europe is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  However, a brief examination of some key themes reveals key 
differences between sports league structures and antitrust scrutiny between 
the European Union and the United States.110  Unlike in the United States, 
sports in Europe are generally governed by central bodies (“SGBs”) with 
wide-reaching powers to regulate both the professional and amateur 
game.111  Accordingly, Budzinski and Syzmanski argue that unlike the 
purely horizontal agreements between teams that form the structure of 
leagues in the United States; European SGBs could be better characterised 
as vertical arrangements in the form of a pyramid, with athletes at the bottom 
and supranational associations at the top.112 
Notwithstanding this, there are no statutory or common-law sporting 
exemptions from the EU competition laws, and although the special 
cooperative character of sports is taken into account, recent developments 
indicate that European authorities are beginning to subject SGBs to stricter 
competition scrutiny on a horizontal basis.113  For instance, in Meca-Medina, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) overturned ten years of jurisprudence 
that SGBs’ “purely sporting rules” were immune from scrutiny due to their 
special character.114  Instead, the ECJ created a Rule of Reason-type 
proportionality test, under which the impugned rules were held to be 
legitimate, proportionate, and consistent with EU competition law. 115  More 
recently, the EC treated the International Skating Union’s eligibility rules, 
although imposed vertically on skaters by an SGB, as a horizontal 
arrangement that illegally limited competition in speed-skating under the 
Meca-Medina test.116  Accordingly, the European experience demonstrates 
that although professional sports markets might have special (non-
 
110.  Although each EU member state has its own domestic competition laws, this section focuses 
on the EU competition laws under articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 101–02, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. 
111.  Budzinski & Szymanski, supra note 17, at 410-16. 
112.  And other parties, including national associations and individual clubs, in between.  The 
arrangements are “vertical” in the sense that they cover multiple levels of the nominal “supply chain” 
for the relevant sport product.  Id. at 411, 416, 422-28. 
113.  See generally Farzin, supra note 22; Geoff Pearson, Sporting Justifications under EU Free 
Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’, 21 EUR. L.J. 220 (2015); 
Erika Szyszczak, Competition and Sport: No Longer So Special?, 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 
188 (2018).  
114.  Case C–519/04, Meca-Medina v. Commission, 2006 E.C.R. I–6991.  See also Pablo Ibáñez 
Colomo, The Application of EC Treaty Rules to Sport: The Approach of the European Court of First 
Instance in the Meca Medina and Piau Cases, 3 ENT. & SPORTS L. J. 1, 1-3 (2005); Farzin, supra note 
22, at 94-97; OECD, supra note 11, at 199-200; Szyszczak, supra note 113, at 191-92. 
115.  Anti-doping rules for swimming, adopted by the International Olympic Committee and 
implemented in the specific case by the Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur. 
116.  That is, a cartel-type arrangement in breach of art 101 of the TEFU: European Commission, 
International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, Case No. AT.40208 (Dec. 8, 2017).  See also Szyszczak, 
supra note 113, at 189-91. 
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economic) characteristics, applying a Rule of Reason test to professional 
sports as an interconnected web of horizontal undertakings between parties 
is not only feasible, but actually enables antitrust law to take those 
characteristics into account in its scrutiny of conduct. 
V.  LOOKING TO NEXT SEASON:  THE FUTURE OF THE SINGLE-ENTITY 
DOCTRINE 
What, then, is the future of the Single-Entity Doctrine as applied to 
sports leagues under United States antitrust law?  In the wake of American 
Needle, the doctrine is in a state of flux. It is not yet confined to the dustbin 
of sports antitrust history; but at the same time, it is entirely unclear whether 
it could ever again be invoked by a sports league.  This section canvasses 
several proposed alternatives to the Single-Entity Doctrine—both before 
and after American Needle—before concluding that the most principled 
approach is to leave the Single-Entity Doctrine behind and, rather than 
attempting to construct a sports-specific rule, simply apply well-tested Rule 
of Reason analysis to leagues’ future decision-making. 
As discussed above, while the scope of the Single-Entity Doctrine 
appears to have been curtailed, in the absence of the Supreme Court setting 
out a specific rule on the matter, American Needle does not preclude the 
possibility that a sports league other than the NFL could attempt to avail 
itself of the doctrine as a defence to a section one claim in future.  A key 
way in which they could do this is by emphasising the structural differences 
between their leagues and the NFL.117  Some sports have followed the 
European model and delegated total authority to a separate, independent 
commission, a model which could be sufficiently distinct from the NFL’s as 
to perhaps still be a “single entity.”  For example, NASCAR was formed in 
the 1940s as “a central racing organization whose authority outranked all 
drivers, car owners, and track owners.”118  Traditional leagues such as the 
NBA and NHL could pursue a full delegation of this type to avoid section 
one scrutiny.  On the other hand, Ross suggests that for traditional American 
leagues, delegating sufficient authority would then remove policy control 
over the sport from clubs, flying in the face of historical league structures 
and incentives, and removing what financial incentive there might be to 
collude, and thus seek the protection of the Single-Entity Doctrine, in the 
first place.119   
In any event, such delegation might not even be commercially possible.  
For instance, Major League Soccer (MLS) was “designed to conform to the 
single entity exception” in the 1990s, by virtue of the league owning all 
 
117.  Grow, American Needle, supra note 31, at 495-98. 
118.  Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra note 7, at 234 (citing ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE 
NASCAR WAY: THE BUSINESS THAT DRIVES THE SPORT 28 (2001). 
119.  Ross, The Single-Entity Doctrine, supra note 7, at 235. 
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teams, all IP and sponsorship rights, employing all players, and selling all 
tickets and all broadcast rights.120  However, commercial imperatives, 
particularly the need for independent investment in clubs, later led the MLS 
to grant franchises more autonomy and individual profit incentives.  In turn, 
this devolving of autonomy “backfired” on the MLS in Fraser v. MLS, in 
which the First Circuit held that franchises were potential competitors and 
the MLS was, therefore, not a single entity under the rule in Copperweld.121  
Accordingly, it may not be possible to structure a team-based sports league 
in the modern economy of professional sports so as to fit within what 
remains of the Single-Entity Doctrine.   
Subsequent to American Needle, Nathaniel Grow has proposed an 
alternative to the Single-Entity Doctrine based on the nature of control and 
the relevant spheres of competition between the parties to a joint venture-
type operation.122  Grow suggested that the Supreme Court’s underlying 
focus in American Needle was to prevent competitors from shielding 
themselves from section one liability by coordinating behind the artifice of 
a nominally independent entity.123  Consequently, he suggests that a joint 
venture-type operation ought to be viewed as a single entity unless it is 
“directly controlled by, or itself directly controls, any actual or potential 
competitors” in the relevant market.124  To protect itself, a “joint venture 
would gain single entity status when its owners effectively merged their 
relevant operations in the venture, thus eliminating any actual or potential 
competition between themselves in that operational sphere.”125   
With respect, Grow’s “solution” is not so much a fix for a problem as it 
is simply changing the character of the problem.126  First, an agreement 
between two competitors to join operations through a new entity, and 
entirely cease actual or potential competition in a market, is really better 
characterised as a merger: an entirely different area of antitrust analysis and 
one that the parties are explicitly trying to avoid by using a joint-venture 
structure.127  Second, even if not structurally a merger, if this is the standard 
Grow sets for the forming of a “single entity,” then by definition the 
agreement that forms this entity—that “eliminate[es] any actual or potential 
 
120.  Farzin, supra note 22, at 88-89; Bryan A. Green, Can Major League Soccer Survive Another 
Antitrust Challenge?  Emerging Threats to its Single Entity Treatment, 4 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. 79, 80-
82 (2009). 
121.  Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d. 47, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2002); Grow, American Needle, 
supra note 31, at 496-97. 
122.  Grow, American Needle, supra note 31, at 484–86. 
123.  Id. at 484. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at 485. 
126.  The analysis in this paragraph is inspired by the critical approach taken to the formation and 
structure of joint ventures in Stephen F. Ross, The Supreme Court’s Renewed Focus on Inefficiently 
Structured Joint Ventures, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 261 (2011). 
127.  A merger that is likely to substantially lessen competition, no less, in breach of the Clayton 
Act.  Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (1914); see 15 U.S.C. § 18.  
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competition” between the parties—is in itself an anticompetitive agreement 
that ought to be scrutinised at the point the joint venture is formed.128   
“Justice Stevens, [in American Needle] even noted that the central evil 
addressed by [section one] is the elimination of competition that would 
otherwise exist.”129  Grow argues that had the NFL teams ceded all 
ownership and control over their trademarks to an independent NFLP, his 
test “would result in a single entity finding,” because NFLP would have 
neither been controlled by, nor controlled, actual or potential competitors in 
the licensing market.130  But in this hypothetical, the teams would only not 
be actual or potential competitors due to the agreement to form NFLP, which 
in turn becomes an agreement attracting antitrust scrutiny.  The problem is 
not solved—just recharacterized. 
On the other hand, there does not appear to be any compelling reason 
why Rule of Reason analysis could not simply be applied to all arrangements 
entered into by sports leagues.  In fact, courts have indeed subjected sports 
to the Rule of Reason on plenty of occasions, and the Court in American 
Needle indicated that many agreements between the NFL’s teams are “likely 
to survive the Rule of Reason.”131  Becoming mired in assessing the 
structure or internal incentives of a venture in order to determine what level 
of scrutiny to apply risks reducing antitrust to the “formalistic” analysis the 
Supreme Court in Copperweld was trying to avoid.  Judge Cudahy’s 
concurring opinion in Bulls II made this clear in stating that  “determining 
whether the potential for inefficient decision making survives within a joint 
venture because of the independent economic interests of the partners is 
extraordinarily complex and confusing . . . the inquiry into whether separate 
economic interests are maintained by the participants in a joint enterprise is 
likely to be no easier than a full Rule of Reason analysis.”132  
Of course, sports leagues have special characteristics, but so too do 
many other markets assessed under the Rule of Reason.  The character of 
sport and the need for cooperation does not preclude the application of Rule 
of Reason analysis.133  In fact, in NCAA v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court 
expressly stated that some core sport-related horizontal restraints, including 
the rules of the game, rules regarding player eligibility, or the sharing of 
responsibilities within a league, “widen consumer choice . . . and hence can 
be viewed as procompetitive” within the Rule of Reason.134  Leagues have 
attempted to craft themselves an exemption from the application of the Rule 
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of Reason relying on this special character; whereas on a proper 
examination, the arrangements that are necessary to ensure this special 
character would not fall victim to the Rule of Reason in the first place, as 
they do not negatively affect competition in the antitrust sense.135 
Any hesitations in applying the Rule of Reason to American sports 
leagues, stemming from a fear that the core workings of those leagues will 
be stymied by continuous frivolous antitrust challenges, are also misguided.  
Under the Supreme Court’s heightened “plausibility” standard for antitrust 
pleadings, developed in Bell v. Twombly, plaintiffs must adduce actual 
plausible evidence of a demonstrable anticompetitive effect in a market;136 
and as evidenced by Salvino, the evidence required to prove market power—
the first step in the Rule of Reason—is incredibly high. 137  In fact, Salvino, 
an antitrust challenge to the MLB’s collective trademark licensing system, 
proved that leagues can successfully dismiss antitrust challenges in markets 
in which teams actually do compete in the economic sense, on the basis of 
compelling evidence of procompetitive cooperation rather than by trying to 
deviously evade scrutiny through structural means.138 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although collaboration and cooperation are essential to the modern 
business of professional sports, leagues in the United States have needlessly 
obfuscated sports antitrust over at least the past forty years by continually 
attempting to use this fact to immunize themselves from section one 
scrutiny. The Supreme Court fumbled a priceless opportunity to clarify this 
concept in American Needle, setting out a narrow ruling that creates more 
confusion than it settles, leaving the future of the Single-Entity Doctrine in 
flux.  Traditional antitrust principles clearly show that sports leagues such 
as the NFL and NHL are not “single entities” to which only section two can 
be applied; instead they are a series of horizontal arrangements between 
competitors to which Rule of Reason analysis can, and should, be applied.  
Such analysis will allow the spirit of professional sports to endure, while 
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